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of collection, and the higher mortality experience result in a rate propor-
tionately higher than the larger policies.83 A sound social attitude would
make available at least a minimum of insurance protection for those with
the greatest need. Short of federal or state operated plans, which may
provide the most desirable way out,8 4 tax exemption of low cost insurance
would be an important step in encouraging forms of insurance suitable for
wage-earners. Thus, the test would shift from its present irrational basis
to one more in accord with the social function of insurance. The lower
price policies of the old line companies might also be exempted on a satis-
factory showing that they were passing the tax savings on to the policy
holders in the form of lower premiums.8 5 Some of the more advanced states
might voluntarily formulate such a broad tax policy in their own insurance
law revision, but the framing of uniform legislation by an organization like
the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners would go furthest
toward reaching the eventual goal. Since much of fraternal insurance already
is adapted to the poorer classes, 6 the fraternal benefit societies could be
expected to lend their assistance in securing the passage of such legislation:
THE SUGAR ACT OF 1937
THE SUGAR Act of 1937,1 re-enacting the fundamental provisions of the
Jones-Costigan Amendment of 1934,2 indicates that the latter legislation,
enacted as an emergency measure, is to become permanent governmental
policy. The Act raises anew the problem of regulating a product that is
more completely dominated by governmental control the world over than
any other basic commodity.3 Its importance and relative cheapness, the ease
with which its few channels of production may be controlled, its specialized
nature rendering protection once granted hard to discontinue, and its im-
portance in military strategy 4 make sugar peculiarly susceptible to a policy
83. See Hobbs, The Role of the Insurance Commissioner in Industrial Life Insurance,
(1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 49; Myers, The Effect of the Social Security Act on
the Life Insurance Needs of Labor (1937) 45 J. POL. ECON. 681.
84. See Taylor, The Case for Government Life Insurance (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP.
POaB. 99; Oglesby, The Case Against Government Life Insurance, id. at 117.
85. Since much of the uncertainty with regard to fraternals arises from the difficulty
of classifying their "policies," the standardized character of old line insurance policies
might well eliminate the accounting complications mentioned supra, p. 977.
86. See table of typical rates in 42 STATIsTIcs FRATERNAL SOCIETIES (1936) 7.
1. 50 STAT. 903, 7 U. S. C. § 1100 et seq. (Supp. 1937).
2. 48 STAT. 672, 7 U.S. C. § 608(a) (1934).
3. For an account of the proration of sugar production in several foreign countries,
see Wiu.cox, CAN INDUSTRY GovmW ITsELF? (1936).
4. Stimulation of domestic production of beet sugar by trade barriers and direct
subsidies is an essential feature of present European military strategy and rearmament
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of economic nationalism. But each attempt at artificial control of produc-
tion has resulted in frequent and aggravated dislocation of world markets,
necessitating in turn more drastic and far-reaching measures. In the United
States, virtually the last of the great nations to undertake complete control
of the production of sugar, social, economic, political, and legal considera-
tions are all involved to a degree which makes analysis difficult, but which
also makes examination and evaluation of real contemporary import.
The sugar industry in this country has been developed chiefly by the appli-
cation of artificial stimuli. The beet sugar industry, starting just before
the turn of the century, has undergone a mushroom growth as a result of
nearly fifty years of protective tariffs,5 assistance in the form of experimenta-
tion and research by the Department of Agriculture," and the reclamation
and irrigation of large areas in the West.7 Louisiana Is a cane sugar in-
dustry entirely dependent upon tariff protection which has long struggled
against unfavorable climatic and soil conditions. Florida alone of the sugar
producing areas in this country is apparently able to produce sugar without
government subsidy, but its small cane sugar industry is of very recent
origin." Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, shipping sugar to the
continental United States free of duty, have become virtually one-crop
countries, completely dependent upon continental consumption.0 And Cuba,
receiving a 20% preferential tariff rate under the Reciprocity Treaty of
190310 and naturally adapted to the production of cane sugar, long ago
achieved a dominating position in the American market.1 1
programs. Even England, rebuilding her navy to protect her overseas trade, is at the
same time subsidizing her beet sugar industry against the day when her navy will no
longer be able to protect food imports. See Janeway, Sugar, A Case History, AsrA,
Aug. 1937, p. 588.
5. There has been a tariff on sugar ever since 1789, but until the McKinley
Tariff of 1890 it was for revenue only. Beginning in that year a direct bounty of
two cents per pound was paid to domestic producers of sugar. The constitutionality
of the bounty was argued in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), but the Supreme
Court expressly refused to decide that question. Thirty millions in subsidies were
expended before the bounty was repealed and the protective tariff reinstated in 1894.
6. See TAussIG, So ¢E ASPECTS OF THE TARIFF QUEsTIo:; (3rd ed. 1931) 80.
7. See Hearings Before Committee on Finance on S. 173a, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1934) 136.
8. For an account of the history and development of the cane sugar industry in
Louisiana and Florida, see DALTON, SUGAR, A CASE STuDY OF GomViaEimu T CONrTOL
(1937) 166 et seq.
9. See generally DALTON, op. cit. snpra note 8, at 188 ct seq.; UrurrED STATES
TARwr Comm., REPORT oN UNrrED STATs-PHILUi'PNE TRADE (1937) 6 et seq., 45
et seq.
10. 33 STAT. 3, 2136 (1903).
11. For brief accounts of the early history of the Cuban sugar industry, see Js,-.xs,
OuR CUBAN CoLONy (1928) 18 et seq., 128 et seq.; FoRaEG PoLic- Assoc, REMaaT
OF THE COmm. ON CuBAN i.FAms (1935) 218 et seq.; ,VRIGnT, Tur CunAN SrruATIo.n
AN OuR TaATY RELATIONS (1931) 48 et seq.
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Sugar received the full impact of the economic dislocation of the war. Both
the United States and Cuba had striven to relieve the serious shortage among
the allied nations.12 Farmers were encouraged to plant sugar beets as a
patriotic measure; American capital poured into Cuba to build and operate
new sugar mills;13 and production was stimulated in the insular areas. 14
During the following decade, production far outran consumption, and as
surpluses accumulated, prices gradually dropped to unremunerative levels.15
Meanwhile an increase in European beet sugar production to the pre-war
norm drastically reduced the world market for Cuban sugar which the war
had developed.16 Nevertheless, Cuban production increased steadily, for
many of the Cuban sugar properties which had fallen into American hands
during the speculative bubble and sharp deflation immediately following the
ArmisticeT were being operated by more efficient methods and machinery.18
In this country the tariff on sugar was raised three times to protect the
domestic industry 9. Disproportionate returns to the insular areas, where
12. The tendency to use beet fields for battle fields reduced European beet sugar
production from over eight million long tons in 1912-13 to two and one half million
tons in 1919-1920. Expressed as a percentage of the world's supply, the drop was from
45% to 17%. See ELLIS, THE TAuRF ox SUGAR (1933) 29.
13. JENEKs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 178 et seq.; WRGHT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 53.
14. For a complete treatment of wartime governmental control of sugar, see BERN-
HARDT, GoW'muEa CONTROL OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES (1920).'
15. The average annual price per pound of duty-paid raw sugar gradually declined
from 6.98 cents in 1923 to 2.80 cents in 1932. UNITED STATES TARIFF Com., REPORT To
THE PRESIDENT ON SUGAR (1934) 46.
16. But Cuba has continued to ship between 20% and 309o of her crop to countries
other than the United States. This has been an important factor in the depression in
world markets. ELLIS, Op. cit. mpra note 12, at 70.
17. Unwise demobilization of the government sugar control boards early in 1919
while sugar was ostensibly scarce unleashed a speculative boom known as the "Dance
of the Millions" which carried the price of raw sugar from 9 cents per pound in
February, 1920, to 22 cents per pound in May, 1920, and back to 3-4 cents in December
of the same year. The reaction brought on a financial and political crisis in Cuba during
which the leading Cuban banks collapsed and control of a large share of Cuban enter-
prise passed into the hands of the New York banking houses. JENcs, op. cit. supro
note 11, at 206 et seq.
18. Cuba increased its production of raw sugar nearly 30%, or over a million long
tons, in the single year 1925. The crop was over five million tons and enough cane
was planted to produce six million tons in 1926. ELLIS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 65.
19. The special session of Congress of 1921 and the regular session of the following
year both raised the tariff on Cuban sugar as an incident of a larger plan to aid the
already deflated peacetime American agriculture. Prices of refined sugar rose to war-
time levels, and in 1923 the Tariff Commission investigated the duty under the flexible
tariff provisions of the Tariff Act of 1922. It recommended a reduction to correspond
to the difference in costs of production, but the President refused. to take any action,
thus effectively nullifying the theory of the flexible tariff insofar as sugar was con-
cerned. See UNITED STATES TARIF Comma., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON SUGAR (1926)
216 et seq. In 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff again raised the duty on Cuban sugar to
a new high of two cents per pound.
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sugar could be produced more cheaply than on the continent, and a conse-
quent increase in production, resulted. In the Philippines the situation was
aggravated by a rapid series of improvements in the growing and grinding
of cane. With the onset of the depression, consumption sharply declined,
yet many American farmers turned to raising sugar beets, not because it
was profitable, but because production of other basic agricultural commodities
was relatively much less remunerative.2 0 By 1932, the price of raw sugar
had reached an all-time low.
Attempts to remedy the increasingly critical situation were varied in form
and both legislative and co~perative in nature. As early as 1926, the Cuban
government began a series of attempts to bolster the price of sugar,2 ' none
of which achieved any lasting success. In 1931, a New York lawyer, Thomas
L. Chadbourne, attempted to effectuate an agreement to reduce production
among the various areas supplying sugar to the American market. But
domestic producers refused to co~perate, contending that the element of
compulsion necessary to enforce conformity to the terms of the agreement
was entirely lacking.2 When it became apparent by 1933 that the protective
tariff was a failure as applied to sugar,23 the Secretary of Agriculture de-
termined to use his licensing power under the Agricultural Adjustment Act
to work out a plan with the industry.24 Accordingly, representatives of all
the producing areas and of the refining interests met at Washington during
the summer of 1933. But the attempt to weld the demands of the most wide-
20. Since the price which domestic producers receive always includes the amount
of the duty, the tariff constituted an irreducible minimum below which the price of
sugar could not 'fall. In the case of other basic commodities with large exportable
surpluses and little tariff protection, no such guarantee was enjoyed.
21. These included experiments with restricted production, delayed production,
market quotas, pools, single selling and export organizations, and a valorization scheme.
See FoRE PoLiCy Assoc., RPor, op. cit. supra note 11, at 240 ct scq.; WRIGHT,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 87 et seq.
22. The Chadbourne Committee continued to negotiate with the leading foreign
sugar producing countries, and the result was an International Agreement signed at
Brussels in May, 1931. Each signatory country was assigned an ex-port quota and
production was effectively reduced, but the objective of higher prices was never reached.
The efforts of the signers, controlling but half the world's supply, were more than
offset by increased production in the non-signatory countries-chiefly the United States
and the British Empire. See generally ELLis, op. cit. jupra note 12, at 176 ct seq.;
FOREIGN POLICy Assoc., REPoRT, op. cit. ,upra note 11, at 244 ef seq.; rZ WILD,
SuGAR, Ar IxTmNATIOAL PaonnLr (1933).
23. The Tariff Commission itself acknowledged this to be the case, pointing out
that prices had been dropping faster than the tariff could be raised, and stating that
no increase in the tariff could alleviate the disastrous condition in which the industry
found itself. The Commission's suggested solution was to limit the imports of sugar
from Cuba and the Philippines. See REPORT, op. cit. mipra note 15, at 25.
24. Both sugar beets and cane had been included in the original Agricultural"
Adjustment Act by the Senate, but had later been removed by the House. 77 Cormo.
REc. 1898 (1933).
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spread industry in America met insurmountable obstacles. The Cuban inter-
ests were inadequately represented, and it was impossible to obtain co6pera-
tion from the others. The assumption that the industry could act as a
coherent whole was proved to be erroneous; the only way in which a final
agreement was reached at all was by the simple but efficacious method of
allocating production quotas with such generosity that the various interests
were satisfied, but the objective of restricting the supply to enhance the
price was rendered quite impossible of attainment.25 In October, 1933, the
Secretary of Agriculture, after conference with the President, rejected the
agreement,26 stating that it provided no effective means of production control
and that it emphasized unduly the interests of sugar processors rather than
the income of farmers.27
The rejection of the Stabilization Agreement caused a speculative reaction
which depressed the American market still further; the industry was con-
vinced that no betterment of general economic conditions could solve its
problems. But by this time the Administration had again become actively
interested both in the plight of the domestic producers and in the situation
in Cuba, where a year of unparalleled economic and political upheaval had
rendered it increasingly plain that the United States must in some manner
come to Cuba's aid.28 In a message to Congress in February, 1934,20 the
President recommended an amendment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
to include sugar beets and sugar cane, the imposition of a processing tax
on sugar, the payment of benefits for crop restriction, the introduction of
a quota system, and a reduction of the tariff on Cuban sugar. The result
was the Jones-Costigan Amendment,3" which naturally embodied these sug-
gestions,8 1 but also set quotas for refined sugar shipped from the insular
25. At the International Sugar Conference at London in May 1937, it was neces-
sary to resort to the same procedure to come to an understanding. See Janeway, loc.
cit. supra note 4.
26. In addition to production quotas for the various areas, the plan provided for
a minimum price for raw sugar to be set by a Stabilization Board, for a loose sort
of acreage control, and for the elimination of unfair competition in the sale of refined
sugar. DALToN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 77 et seq.
27. See AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT, REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE Aciu-
CULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT, MAY 1933-FEB. 1934 (1934) 191.
28. Years of falling prices and shrinking markets were climaxed by the expulsion
of Machado in August 1933, and a situation which approached anarchy. The current
crop was the smallest since 1911 ; exports of sugar to the United States were at the
lowest level since 1908; the value of all exports was equal to that of 1903. The alterna-
tive to military intervention was substantial economic assistance.
29. 78 CONG. REc. 2176 (1934).
30. 48 STAT. 672, 7 U. S. C. § 608(a) (1934).
31. Production quotas for the domestic beet and cane areas were set by the terms
of the Act itself. Quotas for the other areas were to be set by the Secretary of Agri-
culture. The Secretary was further empowered to make estimates of consumption
requirements as a basis for the quotas, to reallocate any portion of a quota which was
not filled, to enter into crop restriction contracts with domestic and insular producers
[Vol. 47: 980
THE SUGAR ACT OF 1937
areas and Cuba. 32 The policy of protection through a tariff was combined
with one of protection through a quota and benefit-payment system, and the
burden of control was shifted from Congress to an Administrative depart-
ment.
With the invalidation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, crop restric-
tion contracts, benefit payments, and the processing tax were discontinued.
The quota limitations, however, were kept in force on the theory that the
decision in the Butler case 3s did not affect those provisions of the law.3 '
Congress debated the problem of regulation in the Spring of 1936, but its
sole action was a joint resolution extending the quota restrictions through
the year 1937.81 Thus the whole problem came up for reconsideration at the
last regular session of Congress. The President asked 30 for the retention of
the quota system, an excise tax on sugar, a sliding scale of benefit payments
to favor the smaller farmer,37 and for uniform wage and hour requirements
and a ban on child labor in the beet fields. The Department of Agriculture's
bill, embodying these suggestions, leaving the production quotas about as
they were, but removing the restrictions on the importation of refined sugar,
was rejected. In the face of Administrative opposition which went to the
length of a threatened Presidential veto,38 the substituted bill that finally
became law scaled down most of the major producing areas slightly in order
to enlarge the quota for the domestic cane producers and restored the
restrictions on imported refined sugar. The bill provided for an excise tax
on sugar and for benefit payments to farmers conditioned on the elimination
of child labor and the payment of minimum wages as determined by the
Secretary of Agriculture. The impending veto did not materialize, but the
President stated that he signed the bill in reliance upon a "gentlemen's
agreement" that refining restrictions on the insular areas and Cuba would
not be included in any future legislation." The United States is thus er-
and to make benefit payments from the proceeds of the processing tax, conditioned on
the elimination of child labor and the payment of minimum wages.
32. For Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines these quotas were cet at an
amount equal to the average imports of refined sugar from those areas for the years
1931-1933. In the case of Cuba an arbitrary figure of 2250 of the total production
quota was set.
33. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
34. The industry was naturally much disquieted. Another conference was held in
Washington, but again the conflicting interests could come to no acceptable agreement.
35. Pun. REs. 109, 49 STAT. 1539 (1936).
36. 81 CoNG. REc. 1694 (1937).
37. With sugar, as elsewhere in the administration of Agricultural Adjustment% the
size of the benefit checks which had gone to large producing units had occasioned con-
siderable adverse comment. See e.g., Hearings Before Committee on Finance on H. R.
7667, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., (1937) 33.
38. See Bus. WV=, May 8, 1937, p. 32.
39. 81 CONG. REr- App. 2553 (1937).
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barked upon a policy of active governmental control of sugar for another
three year period.
40
The unfortunate, if inevitable, aspect of these attempts to alleviate the
troubles of the sugar industry is that the proration of sugar production has
necessarily been based upon the political bargaining power of the conflicting
interests involved rather than on any sound economic theory. The highly
organized domestic beet sugar industry, launched under tariff protection and
fostered by government assistance, is in the strongest position.41 Because of
its sectionalized nature, its 'representatives in Congress are extremely sensi-
tive to their constituents' demands, and its political strength, especially in
the Senate, was sufficient to assure it the most favored treatment under the
provisions of the Act. 42 The domestic cane producers have less representa-
tion in Congress, but, although their quota restrictions were more severe
than those of the competing beet growers, they possess all the psychological
advantages which producers of a domestic product enjoy over competition
from the "offshore areas" or foreign countries.
The insular territories and Cuba are not, however, entirely devoid of
support. Puerto Rico and Hawaii have no voting strength in Congress, but
are compensated to some extent by the sentimental interest which this
country has always had in treating its territories and possessions with equal-
ity and fairness so as to avoid any stigma of imperialism or colonial ex-
ploitation. The Department of the Interior is especially vigilant in protecting
the interests of the insular areas. 43 The United States has felt a similar
sentimental concern over Cuba because of the ties engendered by the Spanish
War and fostered by the Platt Amendment.44 But undoubtedly of more
significance here has been the influence of the tremendous amount of American
40. The restrictions on imported refined sugar extend only through the first two
months of 1940. This was a compromise with the bitter opposition to this feature of
the law.
41. Far Western farmers are organized in the National Beet Growers Association;
the producers of the Middle West are affiliated in the Farmers and Manufacturer's Beet
Sugar Association.
42. When the Jones-Costigan Act was before Congress it was necessary to enlarge
the suggested quota for the beet area and to fix the actual amount in the terms of the
bill itself so as to prevent the beet interests from defeating the legislation entirely.
They were not quite so articulate when the Sugar Act was being debated, having
failed in each year to produce the quota which the former Act allotted them. Compare
Hearings, supra note 7, at 40 et seq., with Hearings, nupra note 37, at 140 ef seq.
43. The Division of Territories and Island Possessions of the Department of the
Interior is in direct charge of insular affairs. Their chief concern was that the restric-
tion on imported refined sugar set an unfortunate precedent for discrimination against
the territories in violation of traditional American principles. See Hearings, Wnpra
note 37, at 129, 132 et seq.
44. The original Platt Amendment, 31 STAT. 897 (1901) was incorporated in the
formal Treaty of Relations, 33 STAT. 2248 (1903). This treaty was abrogated by a
new treaty negotiated in May, 1934, 48 STAT. 1682 (1934).
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capital invested in Cuba both in sugar and in other enterprise.40 In addition,
the Department of State favors a liberal attitude toward Cuban sugar as the
only means of bolstering Cuba's reciprocal trade with this country.40 Of
all the off-shore areas the Philippines are at present in the most unenviable
position. Their production was restricted more severely than any other area
by the quotas imposed by the Jones-Costigan Amendment and the Sugar
Act of 1937. Moreover, due in large measure to the activities of the beet
sugar interests, which were desirous of freeing themselves from the com-
petition of Philippine sugar,47 the islands are well on their way to a status
of independence. But under the terms of the Independeace Act,48 they are
required to impose an export tax on their sugar beginning in 1940, and after
1945 Philippine sugar will pay the full duty. Unless the terms of the Act
are altered,49 the Philippines are faced with the prospect of a steadily decreas-
ing American market for their sugar crop and concomitant severe economic
dislocation.50
The domestic cane sugar refiners of the Eastern seaboard, popularly known
as the "Sugar Trust," are the last of the interests involved. This group
also suffered from the overexpansion of the XVorld War, and since that time
they have been operating at little more than fifty percent of their capacity.51
Their exports of refined sugar, built up by the wartime demand, have dwindled
to almost nothing with the return to normal of European beet sugar pro-
duction;52 and the depression has meant a declining consumption at home.53
Their chief grievance, however, has been the influx of competing refined
45. One pre-depression estimate placed the total at well over a billion dollars of
which 600 million was invested in sugar. See Jmris, op. cit. stipra note 11, at 281
et seq.
46. The value of our exports to Cuba fell from 191 million dollars in 1924 to
22 million in 1933. Sugar proration and the Trade Agreement increased the value
to 55 million in one year and to 64 million in two. The State Department vigorously
opposed the further limitation on Cuban refined sugar under the Sugar Act as violative
of the trade agreement, which was based on the assumption that sugar quotas would not
be changed to Cuba's disadvantage. See Hearings, supra note 37, at 177 et seq.
47. See Conx, PIcKING AMEIucA's PocKETs (1936) 69 et seq.
48. 48 STAT. 456, 48 U. S. C. § 1231 et seq. (1934).
49. The Independence Act provides for a trade conference which may formulate
recommendations as to future trade policies. Thus authorized, a Joint Preparatory Com-
mittee on Philippine Affairs has proposed the extension of trade preferences through
1960. N' Y. Times, April 6, 1938, p. 10, col. 3. However, its recommendations will
require Congressional approval to become effective.
50. UNrr~a STATES TAiurF Coarm., REPomr, op. cit. supra note 9, at 60 et seq.
51. This was the figure accepted by the Supreme Court in The Sugar Institute, Inc.
v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 574 (1936).
52. Exports of refined sugar dropped from 918,000 tons in 1922 to 49,000 in 1932.
See U=mn, STATEs TAuIrr Cormm., RmRoa, op. cit. supra note 15, at 97.
53. Domestic consumption dropped nearly three-quarters of a million tons between
1929 and 1932. Id., at 93.
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sugar from Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba." After at-
tempts to raise the tariff on refined sugar had failed,5r they concentrated
their efforts upon limiting the importation of the refined product from these
areas. This was done in the face of determined opposition from the inter-
ested administrative departments, from the islands, and from Cuba; there
were cries of discrimination against the territories and unfairness to Cuba,
allegations of monopolistic activities, 0 and accusations of an alliance with
the beet sugar interests, 57 but the sugar refiner's lobby has been characterized
as the most powerful pressure group in Washington," and their demands
were recognized..
Years of artificial stimulation of the domestic sugar industry combined
with the disastrous aftermath of the war have probably rendered proration
inevitable; but the impact of opposing pressure groups, necessitating proration
upon the basis of political strength, has created a fundamentally wasteful
solution in terms of the economic production and distribution of sugar as
a commodity. To be sure, the domestic producing areas themselves have
benefited from the legislation. The price of raw sugar has been raised for
all producers; " the domestic beet and cane areas are protected against more
efficiently produced sugar; Cuba is shipping more sugar to the American
market than it did during the latter years of the twenties;CO the domestic
refiners are protected against a further increase in imported refined sugar;
and the future holds complete darkness only for the Philippines. But against
these benefits we must balance the vital factor of the public interest. Pro-
tection of the domestic beet and cane producers costs the American consumer
three hundred million dollars a year even after the duties collected by the
54. Imports of Cuban refined sugar increased from 4000 tons in 1925 to 490,000 tons
in 1932. Id., at 92, 101. Imports from the insular areas have increased in similar pro-
portion. See AmEIcAN SUGAR REFINING COMPANY- ANNUAL REPORTS, 1929-35.
55. The traditional tariff policy provided for a differential of well over two cents
per pound between the duties on raw and refined sugar. In the Tariff Act of 1930
the protection for refined sugar was apparently inadvertently omitted and the result
was a very small differential in favor of refined sugar. Pressure was brought to bear
upon the Tariff Commission to adjust the duty, but that body, after investigation
covering a period of three years, refused to recommend a change. UNrrrn STATES
TARiFF Com., REPORT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 11.
56. The record of the cane refiners under the Anti-trust laws has been used con-
stantly as a weapon of attack. Cf. The Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553
(1936); Mermin, Sugar-A Rugged Collectivist (1936) 31 IL., L. REv. 320.
57. E.g., the statement of the President when he signed the Sugar Act. 81 CoNo.
RE. APP. 2553 (1937).
58. See NEw REPULic, Aug. 18, 1937, p. 33.
59. The total duty-paid price for raw sugar averaged 3.62 for 1936 as opposed to
2.92 for 1932. DALTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 279.
60. But Cuba is still confronted with the problem of reorganizing her domestic
economy. The total market for Cuban sugar is at present about 3 million tons. The
island's capacity is 6 million tons. See FOREIGN POLIcY Assoc., REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 294 et seq.
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Treasury have been discounted."' No attempt is made in the present scheme
of regulation to encourage production in those fields which can produce
sugar most economically and to discourage it in the fields which require
subsidization. Thus, despite the inefficiency and enx-pensiveness of the beet
sugar industry and the well nigh intolerable working conditions in the beet
fields,6 2 the latter area is the only one not really restricted by the quotas
which have been imposed.63 The most efficient producing areas have received
the most drastic restrictions. A proration system has been devised which
prohibits the State of Florida, the only area on the continent which could
produce sugar profitably without a tariff or direct subsidy, from producing
more than fifty percent of its own intrastate consumption. Moreover, the
federal government has assisted in increasing the supply of sugar by spend-
ing enormous sums on research, irrigation, and reclamation during a period
when production was already far outstripping consumption. 4 As a conse-
quence of these measures, legislation ostensibly enacted for the relief of
domestic farmers results in a net loss to them.05 But the repercussions of
our present mode of regulation are not limited to these domestic complica-
tions. The Philippines have been virtually forced into independence in order
to be free of their efficiently produced sugar; in return an outright gift of
some fifty million dollars is made to the Philippine Treasury-a gift highly
suggestive of a salve to the Congressional conscience.c It is in the light of
such considerations that the present solution is to be heartily condemned.
61. Prior to the proration of sugar production by Congress, the price of raw sugar
was the basic, or world price, plus the Cuban duty. Cuban sugar had pushed all other
foreign sugar from the market as early as 1912. The full duty thereupon ceased to be
operative upon the price and Cuba lost the benefit of the 20% tariff differential granted
by the Treaty of 1903. After the quota system was inaugurated, the price of raw sugar
was determined by the world price plus the full duty, plus a premium due to the
restriction of production caused by the quota system itself. Cuba regained the prefer-
ence she had lost; all areas now reap the benefit of the consumer tax. Treasury receipts
are only 15% of the present consumer contribution, having dwindled from 124 millions
in 1925 to 35 million in 1935, and sugar has become of limited importance as a source
of Federal revenue. See DALTON, op. cit. mupra note 8, at 278 ci seq.; ELus, op. ch.
supra note 12, at 148 ct seq.; Hearings, supra note 37, at 150.
62. See THOMAs, HUMIAN ExPLorrATioN (1934) 251 ct seq.
63. See note 42, .spra.
64. As perhaps the most recent example, the Department of Agriculture by the
introduction of new varieties of cane in Louisiana, doubled the yield per acre between
1928 and 1936. Hearings, mpra note 37, at 28.
65. The value of the beet sugar crop at the world or base price is less than the
consumer tax paid by the farmers-to say nothing of the total population-of the United
States. Id., at 197 et seq.; ConN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 72.
66. The Revenue Act of 1934 §602%, [48 STAT. 763, 26 U. S. C. §999 (1934)]
imposes a three cent tax on domestic processing of Philippine cocoanut oil and provides
that the revenue from such taxes shall be held as a separate fund and paid to the
Philippine Treasury. Similarly, the proceeds of the excise tax on Philippine sugar
under § 1173 of the Sugar Act are to go to the Philippine government for economic
rehabilitation, provided none of the money is used for benefit payments to Philippine
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It is clear that in terms of economic distribution, domestic production should
be retired and a fundamentally unsound utilization of capital and labor
resources be terminated. This country could make an outright gift to the
domestic producers of the full value of their crop during the transition to
other channels of production and still save substantial amounts over the
present system, which taxes the consumer three hundred millions in order
to produce less than seventy million dollars worth of domestic beet and cane
sugar. Nor would the retirement of domestic production result in a shortage
injurious to the consumer. If quota restrictions were removed, Cuba alone
could produce enough sugar to satisfy our domestic needs.07 Even though
it be admitted that free trade is a dead issue6s and that the domestic industry
must be maintained, a system of direct subsidies would be far more beneficial
to the public interest. Bounties could thus be paid to the various producing
areas in proportion to their costs of production instead of raising prices
to a point covering the highest costs-the present solution, which necessarily
gives inordinate returns to the low-cost areas.
69
But if the sensible solution is clear, it is equally clear that such a solution
is impossible of attainment in this country. In the first place, there is no
highly organized consumer pressure group, and consumer education is sadly
lacking.70 The enormous tax which the consumer pays on his sugar is effec-
tively disguised in the form of tariffs and quota restrictions. Secondly, there
are numerous psychological factors which render the continuance of the
present system a practical certainty. The feeling is intense in many quarters
that we must foster our domestic sugar industry, regardless of cost, in order
to be prepared against a shortage in case of war.71 This argument, however,
overlooks the small percentage of our consumption needs filled at home as
sugar producers. Such a salve is constitutional. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States,
301 U. S. 308 (1937).
67. See note 60, supra.
68. In 1914, Congress reduced the duty on sugar and provided that it should go on
the free list in 1916, but protectionist strength increased sufficiently in the mid-term
elections of 1914 to prevent the policy from being carried out. In the recent debates
over the Jones Costigan Act and the Sugar Act there was not a whisper of the possi-
bility of free trade in sugar.
69. The present Sugar Act employs this principle to a certain extent in that benefits
are supposedly paid producers in relation to their costs of production. But the low
cost areas still receive the benefits from a tariff aimed at protection of the highest
cost areas, and all areas receive the benefits of the price enhancement due to the quota
restrictions. See DALTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 281.
70. The Fair Tariff League, an organization purporting to have two million
members, has repeatedly appeared before Congressional committees handling sugar
legislation, but apparently their efforts have been of little avail.
71. This feeling is of course attributable to the reaction from the World War. But
the shortage of sugar in the United States was more a "war scare" than a reality. See
JENKS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 196 et seq.
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well as the proximity of the Cuban supply. Furthermore, sugar, as virtually
the only basic agricultural commodity of which the continent does not raise
an exportable surplus, has long been the spearhead of American agricultural
protectionism. The American Farm Bureau and the National Grange will
rally the farmers to the slogan, "The American Market for the American
Farmer," even if it is more costly to them as a group to do so. The idea
that "free trade" would utterly destroy the entire domestic industry is every-
where accepted as absolute truth, even though recognized economists have
estimated from time to time that substantial portions of it would survive
without tariff protection. 2 The cane refiners have employed equally potent
symbols in their fight to restrict the importation of refined sugar. Premised
on the necessity of protecting the "home industry" from "cheap tropical
labor" and of favoring "America first" as against a "foreign country," their
propaganda has produced the desired results - despite the facts that labor
costs in refining sugar are lower than in any other major industry, 3 that
the Tariff Commission twice refused to recommend an increase in the tariff
on refined sugar, since their investigations disclosed that the cost of refining
sugar in Cuba was equal to the cost of refining it in this country,74 and that
the insular refiners and their laborers are for the most part American citizens
and more than half of the Cuban refineries are American owned and oper-
ated.75
Lastly, it is doubtful if the base for a new solution to the problem can
be laid by subjecting the present Sugar Act to an attack on constitutional
grounds. The provisions for benefit payments conditioned on the abolition
of child labor and the payment of minimum wages are seemingly a re-enact-
ment of the essential provisions of the invalidated Agricultural Adjustment
Act, but in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court involving
the taxing power 7 6 and the commerce clause" and the drastic change in
that body's personnel the validity of this portion of the present legislation
would seem assured.7 8 A previous attack upon the constitutionality of this
type of legislation failed when Hawaii contested the validity of the quota
72. These estimates vary from 50% to 80% for the beet industry and 105%0 to 40%
for the Louisiana cane industry. Apparently no recent estimates have been made, how-
ever. See Er.is, op. cit. supra note 12, at 155, n. 9.
73. Labor costs in refining sugar run as low as 5%. Domestic cane refineries
employ a total of approximately 13,000 men.
74. UNrr= STATEs TARu Conr., Rn, oar, op. cit. supra note 15, at 103 el seq.
75. The largest refinery in Cuba representing an investment of 40 million dollars,
is owned and operated by the Hershey Corporation of Hershey, Pa.
76. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937) (Social'Security Act).
77. Associated Press v. N. L R. B., 301 U. S. 103 (1937) (Wagner Act).
78. In addition to benefit payments and crop restriction contracts, the recently
adopted Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 provides for proration and quotas for
all basic crops when production sufficiently exceeds consumption requirements. See
N. Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1938, p. 6, col. 3.
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assigned her under the Jones-Costigan Amendment in 1934.79 The Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia held that the discretion vested in the
Secretary of Agriculture was not an excessive delegation of legislative power
and that the fixing of an import quota did not deprive the Hawaiian pro-
ducers of property without due process of law. 0 Because of a gentleman's
agreement with the Secretary of Agriculture the decision was not appealed.81
Perhaps the most vulnerable portion of the present Sugar Act is the restric-
tion on imported refined sugar. Since there are no equivalent restrictions
on any continental area, the question of arbitrary discrimination against the
territories is thus raised. It has been stated that the principle to be derived
from the diversity of opinion in the Insular Cases 82 is that in the case
of an unincorporated territory the power of Congress to legislate is restrained
only by those fundamental principles which protect life, liberty, and prop-
erty;83 in the case of an incorporated territory Congress is limited by all
provisions of the Constitution applicable to the territories.8 4 Under this
rule, even though Puerto Rico is unincorporated8 r and Hawaii incorpor-
ated,86 the rights of both would be involved, for the question would be one
of due prdcess. The possible invalidation of this portion of the Act, however,
would in nowise affect the primary features concerning the proration of
production and distribution of raw sugar; and, as a means of preventifg
the continuance of the domestic refiner's monopoly, of frustrating the power
of their lobby at Washington, and of removing the unfortunate precedent of
discrimination against the territories, it would in fact be a highly desirable
consummation. The rest of the Act is, as a practical matter, apparently
immune from attack, since all the interests involved, with the possible excep-
tion of Florida,8 7 are receiving sufficient benefits from the operation of the
law to negative any desire on their part to attack its validity.
79. For summaries of Hawaii's grievances and her reasons for taking judicial action,
see Cooke, The Jones-Costigan Act as it Affects Hawaii (1934); Garfield, Hawaii's
Basic Reasons For Contesting the Costigan-Jones Amendmwnt (1934).
80. Ewa Plantation Co., et al. v. Wallace, 62 Wash. Law Rep. 830 (1934). In
retrospect, the failure of Congress to fix the quotas for all areas might well make the
legislation vulnerable under the standard later laid down by the Supreme Court in
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935) and Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). In the Sugar Act this contingency is removed;
quotas for all areas are set by the Act itself.
81. See Hearings, supra note 37, at 11.
82. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1 (1901) ; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901).
83. Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. Ynchausti & Co., 251 U. S. 401, 406
(1920); Soto et al. v. United States, 273 Fed. 628, 633 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921); Neuss,
Hesslein & Co., v. Edwards, 30 F. (2d) 620, 621 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
84. Alaska v. Troy, 258 U. S. 101, 110 (1922).
85. Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U. S. 298 (1922).
86. 31 STAT. 141 (1900), 48 U.S.C. §495 (1934).
87. Florida, having spent much time and money in draining and dredging the
Everglades preparatory to planting sugar cane, is especially bitter at legislation which
compels the land to lie idle. See Hearings, supra note 37, at 31 et seq.
[Vol. 47: 980
THE SUGAR ACT OF 1937
The future of the sugar problem under government control is of course
pure speculation. But if, as seems inevitable, legislation of the type of the
Sugar Act continues, certain trends will undoubtedly make themselves felt.
The power of the beet sugar interests will probably defeat attempts to freeze
that industry at its present level, to say nothing of attempts to restrict or
retire it. At present, beet sugar production can expand slightly before its
quota is reached; in the future new quotas will no doubt be similarly favor-
able. The increase in the production of beet sugar will tend to replace
Philippine sugar, which, unless some new trade agreement is effected, will
become less and less a factor in the American market. This gradual replace-
ment of efficiently produced sugar by inefficiently produced sugar may well
tend to raise the price to the consumer despite the demonstrated ability of
the Department of Agriculture to control prices through its estimates of
consumption requirements.8 8 And although it is the President's "under-
standing" that in the future the restrictions on refined sugar from the terri-
tories and Cuba are to be removed, they are more than likely to remain
and may well tend to become more and more severe. While experience has
taught that efforts to incite action by consumers will meet with disappoint-
ment and defeat, the only alternative to increased control of production
along present uneconomic lines seems to be consumer education and consumer
rebellion.
88. In October, 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture raised his estimate of consumption
requirements and reallotted the excess. The depressing effect upon prices vas immediate.
See Bus. WsEr, Oct. 2, 1937, p. 28.
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